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Why do Foreigners Suffer Most? 
Abstract 
 
In Germany, immigrant unemployment is not only higher than native unemployment; it 
also reacts more to changes in the situation on the labor market. Decomposing the gap 
between native and immigrant unemployment into a baseline and a labor-market 
situation component, I find that the unemployment rate of immigrants would lie at 5.6 per-
centage points for zero native unemployment (the baseline component of the gap). An 
increase in overall unemployment by 1 percentage point leads to a 0.7 percentage points 
higher increase in immigrant unemployment than in native unemployment (the situation 
component). The large part of this difference, about 3/4 of the baseline and 4/5 of the 
situation component, can be explained by differences in the endowments with classical 
human capital (educational degrees and experience) between immigrants and natives. 
Also controlling for country-specific human capital, particularly language skills, the 
situation component becomes insignificant and the baseline effect again decreases by 
1/2. Adding controls for social networks, the baseline effect also becomes insignificant. 
Thus, human capital and social networks can possibly fully explain the difference 
between native and immigrant unemployment in Germany. 
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A substantial part of today’s German labor force consists of immigrants; in 2008, the
share of foreigners amounted to 8.7% (Statistisches Bundesamt). The share of foreign born
people in the German labor force is still considerably larger (17.1% in 2005, see Geis et al.,
2009). Due to their large number, the situation of immigrants on the labor market has a
strong eﬀect on overall welfare in Germany. Employment statistics show that the labor
market situation of immigrants is bad: In 2008, the unemployment rate of foreigners was
18.1%, whereas the overall unemployment rate was only 8.0% (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit,
2009). Comparing the developments in total and foreign unemployment over time, leads to
an additional ﬁnding. The gap between foreign and native unemployment is particularly
high in years with a high overall unemployment rate; ﬁgure 1 depicts foreign and overall
unemployment rates in Western Germany between 1969 and 2008.1 This paper analyzes
empirically the reasons for the gap between native and immigrant unemployment as well
as the stronger ﬂuctuation in immigrant unemployment. I ﬁnd that the main reason for
both is the lower endowment with human capital of immigrants; besides, lower formal
degrees, lacking language skills are also a reason for the worse situation of foreigners.
At least for the gap between native and immigrant unemployment, diﬀerences in social
networks also play a role.
Up to now, empiric papers on the diﬀerences between immigrant and native unem-
ployment in Germany are scarce. In contrast to this, a substantial literature deals with
diﬀerences in wages between immigrants and natives in Germany (see Thomsen et al.,
2007; Lang, 2005, and the citations in them) . This is astonishing, as employment and un-
employment rates immensely diﬀer between natives and immigrants in Germany, whereas
wage levels are nearly identical, see Geis et al. (2009). For other countries, there are also
much more studies on diﬀerences in wages between immigrants and natives than on dif-
ferences in employment. However for instance in the US, the diﬀerence in unemployment
rates between immigrants and natives is negligible, whereas the diﬀerence in wages is much
larger than in Germany, see Geis et al. (2009). The same explanations (diﬀerences in hu-
man capital, discrimination, etc.) suggest themselves for diﬀerences in un-/employment
1Focussing on Western Germany has two advantages. First, it allows to trace unemployment back
before 1990. Second, as over 95% of the foreigners in Germany today live in Western Germany, it also
makes foreigners and natives better comparable. Therefore, in the following the paper focuses on Western
Germany.
1Figure 1: Development of foreign unemployment in Western Germany
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2009); Since 2002 data include former Eastern Berlin.
and wages between natives and immigrants; nevertheless, the (quantitative) relevance of
these explanations can completely diﬀer (see Nordin and Rooth, 2009). Thus, to under-
stand why immigrants are so badly integrated into the German labor market, diﬀerences
in un-/employment rates have to be analyzed.
Up to now, Dustmann et al. (2009) is the only paper documenting that immigrant
employment in Germany (and the UK) reacts considerably more to cyclical variations
than native employment.2 They also analyze the eﬀects of cyclical ﬂuctuations on wages
and ﬁnd no diﬀerence between immigrants and natives. Moreover, they include controls
for (rough) education groups and age in their empiric analysis and still ﬁnd a stronger
cyclicality of immigrant unemployment; my estimations also indicate that formal degrees
cannot fully explain the stronger reaction of immigrant unemployment to changes on the
labor market (see below). The fact that immigrant unemployment is not only higher but
also more cyclical than native unemployment, has implications for an empirical analysis of
2Nevertheless, there are also some papers on the cyclical development of the unemployment rates of
the Black in the U.S.; Abbring et al. (2001), Bradbury (2000), Couch and Fairlie (2008), Fairlie and
Sundstrom (1997) and Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999).
2the native-immigrant un-/employment gap. The gap can be decomposed into a baseline
component and a labor-market situation component3 (in the following called situation
component): The baseline component measure the diﬀerence between immigrant and
native unemployment assuming some ﬁxed level of native unemployment. The situation
component measures in how far immigrant and native unemployment react diﬀerently to
changes on the labor market (or to changes in the overall unemployment rate respectively).
The decomposition allows us to assess how large immigrant unemployment would be for
diﬀerent situations on the labor market; this is a precondition to evaluate labor market
measure for immigrants, when the labor market simultaneously changes due to cyclical
ﬂuctuations.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic panel, I analyze the two components
of the native-immigrant unemployment gap. Fixing native unemployment at zero and
deﬁning immigrants as foreigners, I ﬁnd a baseline component of 5.6; this means that,
for a native unemployment rate of zero, the unemployment rate of immigrants would be
5.6 percentage points. The situation component is 0.7; this means that a one percentage
point increase in the total unemployment rate increases immigrant unemployment by 0.7
percentage points more than native unemployment. In a further step, I analyze potential
explanations for these diﬀerences between native and immigrant unemployment. For this,
I include controls for various factors that can aﬀect the probability of an individual to be
employed in my empiric analysis. I ﬁrst include the “classical” determinants of the labor
market situation of an individual; personal characteristics, as age and sex, educational
degrees and employment experience. Both, the baseline and the situation component of
the unemployment gap are still signiﬁcant; however, the baseline component decreases by
3/4 and the situation component by 4/5.
The “classical” determinants are primarily measures for general human capital. How-
ever, country-speciﬁc human capital, as language skills, can also aﬀect the labor market
success of an immigrant. Additionally controlling for lacking language skills decreases
both components of the unemployment gap by 1/2. The situation component is no more
statistically signiﬁcant indicating that this component is potentially fully explained by
the “classical” determinants and lacking country-speciﬁc human capital. Not only human
3This component measures primarily the eﬀect of cyclical ﬂuctuations. However, as the baseline is
calculated for a ﬁxed unemployment rate and not the trend unemployment rate, it is not a business cycle
component in the proper meaning of the word.
3capital but also the position of an individual in the society can aﬀect her employment
success. Immigrants can have a lower position than natives due to discrimination; this
can be taste based discrimination or some sort of statistical discrimination. However,
lacking social networks can also impair the position of immigrants in the society. Includ-
ing self-assessed discrimination and / or measure for social networks (number of friends,
contact to Germans) in my estimations, the baseline component as well as the situation
component of the unemployment gap become statistically and economically insigniﬁcant.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, the empirical approach
and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) as data source are described. Section
3 discusses estimates for the components of the native-immigrant unemployment gap
without controls. In section 4, the eﬀect of the “classical” determinants of labor market
success, educational degrees and employment experience, on the unemployment gap are
analyzed. Section 5 deals with the eﬀects of language ﬂuency and assimilation. In section
6, the relevance of discrimination and lacking social networks for the diﬀerence between
native and immigrant unemployment are discussed. Section 7 concludes and discusses
policy implications.
2 Data and empiric approach
Employment rates of immigrants can be strongly aﬀected by immigration and emigration
ﬂows. Assume for instance that at a certain point in time a large number of highly
qualiﬁed people arrive and immediately get a job. At this time, the employment rate
of immigrants will rise, although none of the unemployed immigrants that have already
lived in the country comes into employment. The unemployment rate of immigrants will
correspondingly decrease. At a later point in time, the aforementioned highly qualiﬁed
people may again emigrate. At this time, the immigrant unemployment rate will increase,
although no immigrant is actually ﬁred. The labor-market situation in an immigration
country can have a strong eﬀect on migration ﬂows, as it aﬀects migration incentives,
as expected wages, and immigration policy (e.g. recruitment programs for specialized
workers). Thus, in- and outﬂows of immigrants can aﬀect the situation component of the
unemployment gap between immigrants and natives.
Dustmann et al. (2009) ﬁnd that cyclical immigration ﬂows are not the driving force
behind the stronger cyclicality of immigrant unemployment in Germany. Analyzing the
4native-immigrant unemployment gap, one should nevertheless control for changes in the
composition of the immigrant labor force.4 A convenient way to do this, is to use panel
data and follow the employment history of the same individuals over time. To properly
measure the situation component5, the data has to contain observations for diﬀerent
labor market situations. The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)6 is well suited
to analyze the native-immigrant unemployment gap. It contains a suﬃcient number
of immigrants and allows to follow the employment histories of individuals over more
than two business cycles (encompassing a large range of labor-market situations). In
addition, the GSOEP contains information on a large variety of individual characteristics;
in particular, it contains information on language usage of immigrants and social networks
– information that is found in few data sets. Descriptive statistics for the variables that
are used in the empiric analysis can be found in table 1.
In 1984, the GSOEP was launched with two partial samples, one for natives (sample
A) consisting of 4,500 households and one for foreigners (sample B) consisting of 1,400
households. This “foreigner sample” mainly covers the families of former “guest worker”.7
In later years, various additional samples have been included in the GSOEP; thereof, the
“immigrant sample” (sample D) that was launched with 522 households in 1994/95 is
also interesting for my analysis, as it covers more or less all immigrant groups.8 Some
of the sampled immigrant households have migrated back in the meantime, so that the
composition of immigrants has also changed in the GSOEP. The GSOEP allows to dis-
tinguish return migration from panel mortality; persons who have migrated back are not
considered in my estimations.9 One could argue that the sampling of the GSOEP leads
some kind of cohort bias. However, comparing samples A and B, this bias should have
the same extent for immigrants and natives.
I deﬁne individuals who state in the survey to be working as employed and individuals
who state to be unemployed as unemployed. Moreover, I deﬁne individuals as being
4The eﬀects of (cyclical) changes in the immigrant labor force are potentially also an interesting object
of investigation. However, they have nothing to do with the integration of immigrants that is actually
analyzed with the native-immigrant unemployment gap.
5If the situation component is not properly measured, the unemployment gap cannot be decomposed.
6see Wagner et al. (2007) for further information on the GSOEP.
7Only households with an Italian, Spanish, Greek, Yugoslavian or Turkish head were sampled.
8The sampling restriction for sample D was that at least one household member has immigrated after
1984.
9Completely balancing the panel would lead to a large loss of observations.
5Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Total Natives Foreigners Born in In former Elsewhere
Population Turkey Yugoslavia
Female 51.32% 52.54% 46.70% 46.38% 50.72% 48.10%
Age 44 46 38 38 43 44
(17.2) (17.6) (14.1) (13.4) (12.5) (14.7)
Birth year 1950 1949 1955 1956 1950 1949
(17.7) (18.3) (14.4) (13.1) (12.0) (14.4)
Empl. Experience 16.2 16.7 13.8 11.9 18.5 18.7
(13.2) (13.3) (12.5) (11.8) (11.9) (12.9)
Unempl. Experience 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.6
(1.6) (1.5) (1.8) (2.1) (1.8) (1.6)
CASMIN 1a 6.58% 2.51% 23.02% 25.91% 22.32% 18.12%
CASMIN 1b 20.30% 17.48% 31.68% 35.71% 27.35% 28.82%
CASMIN 1c 33.87% 36.06% 25.03% 21.09% 35.23% 29.32%
CASMIN 2a 4.89% 4.63% 5.92% 6.34% 2.10% 3.35%
CASMIN 2c-gen. 3.48% 3.76% 2.36% 1.24% 0.89% 2.16%
CASMIN 2c-voc. 4.88% 5.70% 1.57% 0.84% 0.45% 3.10%
CASMIN 3a 3.16% 3.74% 0.80% 0.68% 0.45% 1.74%
CASMIN 3b 6.03% 6.91% 2.52% 1.69% 2.16% 4.49%
Degree abroad 14.65% 0.87% 67.00% 74.57% 82.35% 54.39%
Years abroad 3.9 0.7 15.9 19.1 21.3 18.8
(9.3) (4.6) (12.4) (10.9) (10.1) (12.6)
Partly for. lang. at home 7.32% 0.22% 35.96% 36.40% 37.21% 27.52%
Mostly for. lang. at home 5.14% 0.08% 25.59% 41.94% 16.17% 17.18%
Newspaper language 4.57 4.99 3.12 2.43 3.48 3.62
(1 only for. - 5 only Ger.) (1.01) (0.16) (1.32) (1.18) (1.12) (1.35)
Sometimes discriminated 7.35% 0.33% 35.72% 43.24% 31.93% 24.80%
Often discriminated 1.67% 0.06% 8.16% 12.02% 5.61% 5.06%
No contact with Germany 2.91% 0.00% 13.99% 21.57% 10.11% 9.55%
Number of friends 4.4 4.3 4.8 5.7 4.3 3.9
(4.3) (4.0) (5.3) (6.6) (3.3) (3.9)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
non-working but in the labor force, if they state to be unemployed or non-working for
reasons other than old age (over 65), education or training, maternity leave and military /
community service. Unemployment rates that are based on these deﬁnitions are lower than
the oﬃcial ones; this is mainly due to the fact that in the oﬃcial statics self-employed, civil
servants and employees below the reporting threshold are not counted as employed. For an
analysis of the native-immigrant unemployment gap, these workers should be considered;
otherwise changes of individuals between dependent work and self-employment and the
like, that may be aﬀected by the labor-market situation, can bias the results. As shown
in ﬁgure 2, oﬃcial unemployment rates and unemployment rates calculated using the
aforementioned deﬁnitions show the same temporal variations.10 As in the oﬃcial data,
foreign unemployment shows a stronger variation than native unemployment. Thus, the
eﬀect of in- and outﬂow of immigrants on the situation component of the immigrant-native
unemployment gap is obviously not substantial for the considered years.
10Curves for samples A-F were included. Samples E+F (launched in 1998 and 2000) cover the whole
population and are large (7,000 households); thus, they make the numbers for the later years more reliable.
6Figure 2: Foreign unemployment in the GSOEP
Source: Own calculations; only persons in Western Germany are considered.
For the empiric analysis of the native-immigrant unemployment gap, I use Pooled
Probit11 as estimation model. The dependent variable in the baseline speciﬁcation is a
binary variable indicating if an individual is unemployed or employed (see above). The
gap between native and immigrant employment rates may diﬀer from the gap between
unemployment rates; therefore, I use a binary variable for being employed or non-working
(see the deﬁnitions above) as dependent variable in some extensions. I decided for the
unemployment gap as baseline speciﬁcation, as non-working is in most cases voluntary.
In the GSOEP, the status of being unemployment comes from a survey question and not
from a registration process; thus, it should comprise the large part of people who are
non-working but want to work. As changes in voluntary non-working aﬀect the results
for the employment gap, the unemployment gap is probably the better measure for the
labor-market situation of immigrants.
11A random or ﬁxed eﬀects model is not suitable for my analyzes, as the variation of interest comes
mainly from the cross-sectional dimension; the baseline component of the unemployment gap is solely
determined by cross-sectional diﬀerences between immigrants and natives. In addition, the determinants
of the unemployment gap, as education levels are primarily, do hardly vary over time.
7To measure the baseline component of the unemployment gap, I use a dummy variable
indicating if an individual is an immigrant or a native person. Immigrants can either be
deﬁned by nationality or by country of birth; as the deﬁnition of immigrants can aﬀect
the results, I work with both deﬁnitions alternately. To measure the situation component,
I use an interaction between the immigrant dummy and state-speciﬁc unemployment rate
at the respective time. In addition, I also control in all estimations for the current labor
market situation using state-speciﬁc unemployment rates. These state-speciﬁc unemploy-
ment rates are annual values12 and come from the oﬃcial statistic.13 In home-country
speciﬁc regressions, I use dummies for being born in Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Southern
Europe, Eastern Europe and elsewhere instead of the immigrant dummy. Each of these
dummies is then interacted with the state-speciﬁc unemployment rates to measure the
situation components of the unemployment gaps for the various groups.
To get qualitatively and quantitatively interpretable results, I calculate marginal ef-
fects at mean; the beta-coeﬃcient for the interacted terms and the interaction term would
not even be qualitatively interpretable (see Ai and Norton, 2003). At the mean denotes
that for all explaining variables the mean values are used in the calculation of the marginal
eﬀects. In Probit regressions, marginal eﬀects diﬀer over observations, as they depend on
the ex-ante probability of the dependent variable (the probability to be unemployed).
Therefore, the results presented in the following hold for average immigrants, but not
necessarily for immigrants with characteristics far away from the average.
3 Decomposition of the native-immigrant unemploy-
ment gap
In this section, I present estimates for the baseline and situation component of the native-
immigrant unemployment gap without further controls. These results tell us in how far
the unemployment gap is driven by the labor-market situation and allow us to assess
12In the GSOEP individual employment is inquired month wise; however, seasonal unemployment
patterns are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, most other variables of interest are only available
on a yearly base.
13The unemployment rates could also be calculated from the GSOEP. However, this has two disad-
vantages. First, this could lead to a endogeneity bias, which is minimized using a diﬀerent source and
deﬁnition of the unemployment rates. Second, the GSOEP is to small to calculate reliable state speciﬁc
unemployment rates and the economic situation in Germany diﬀers over states.
8Table 2: Foreigner-native unemployment gap without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.0070*** 0.0072*** 0.0064*** 0.0068*** 0.0073*** 0.0084***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Foreigner 0.0564*** 0.0552*** 0.0576*** 0.0554*** 0.0599*** 0.0461***
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.00050) (0.0063) (0.0078)
Foreigner*unempl. 0.0069*** 0.0070*** 0.0074*** 0.0076*** 0.0061*** 0.0131***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0027)
R2 0.0281 0.0257 0.0234 0.0314 0.0250 0.0037
Observations 122956 133536 169861 71772 51184 158451
Samples A+B A-D A-F A+B A+B A+B
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for unemployment/employment, in (6) for non-employment/employment. The
estimation method is pooled Probit and the displayed coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects at the mean. Standard errors are
given in parenthesis; * signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5%-level and *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. In (4)
only males and in (5) only females are considered.
how large the unemployment gap would be under diﬀerent labor market situation (dif-
ferent aggregate unemployment rates). With this information predictions of immigrant
unemployment can be derived from predictions of the overall unemployment rate. This is
necessary for evaluating immigration policy measures; it allows us to calculate immigrant
unemployment in the counterfactual case although the labor-market situation changes
due to cyclical variation.14
The results for the two components of the unemployment gap are given in tables 2 and
3; in table 2, immigrants are deﬁned by nationality, whereas in table 3 they are deﬁned
by country of birth. Estimated marginal eﬀects for the baseline speciﬁcation (samples
A and B) deﬁning immigrants as foreigners are displayed in the ﬁrst column of table 2.
The value for baseline component is given by the estimator for the foreigner dummy of
0.056. It indicates that, for a native unemployment rate of zero, immigrant unemployment
rate would be 5.6 percentage points. The estimator for the interaction term of 0.0070
measures the situation component. It indicates that, if the overall unemployment rate
increases by 1 percentage point, the immigrant unemployment rate increases by 0.70
percentage points more than native unemployment. For an overall unemployment rate of
7.2 percentage points, the Western German unemployment rate in 2008, my estimation
predict a diﬀerence between native an immigrant unemployment of 5:6+0:77:2 = 10:6
percentage points; this almost exactly equals the actual diﬀerence of 10.5 percentage
points.15 To test the robustness of these results, I have repeated the regression using
14As such immigration policy measures generally work in the long run, (cyclical) labor market changes
are an important issue for their evaluation.
15The oﬃcial foreigner unemployment rate in western Germany was 16.8 percentage points and the
oﬃcial native unemployment rate 6.3 percentage points.
9Table 3: Foreign born-native unemployment gap without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.0070*** 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0085*** 0.0078***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Foreign born 0.0551*** 0.0576*** 0.0620***
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0080)
Foreign born*unempl. 0.0057*** 0.0060*** 0.0113***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0027)
Born in Turkey 0.1009*** 0.1042*** 0.1527***
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0134)
Turkey*unemployment 0.0108*** 0.0115*** 0.0134***
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0045)
Former Yugoslavia 0.0539*** 0.0539*** 0.0083
(0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0156)
Yugoslavia*unempl. 0.0140*** 0.0142*** 0.0231***
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0047)
Southern Europe 0.0350*** 0.0357*** -0.0147
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0013)
S. Europe*unempl. 0.0006 0.0017 0.0016
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0045)
Eastern Europe 0.0398** 0.0660*** 0.1192***
(0.0173) (0.0098) (0.0286)
E. Europe*unempl. 0.0023 0.0055* -0.0018
(0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0082)
Born elsewhere 0.0084 0.0273** 0.0023
(0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0228)
Elsewhere*unempl. -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0038
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0067)
R2 0.0271 0.0290 0.0319 0.0329 0.0048 0.0100
Observations 122956 133536 122956 133536 158451 158451
Samples A+B A-D A+B A-D A+B A+B
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for unemployment/employment, in (5) and (6) for non-
employment/employment. The estimation method is pooled Probit and the displayed coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects
at the mean. Standard errors are given in parenthesis; * signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5%-level and ***
signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
more samples from the GSOEP and diﬀerentiating between men and women, see columns
2 to 5 of table 2. The estimation results are hardly aﬀected by these changes.
Changing the deﬁnition of immigrants to people who are born abroad has a stronger
eﬀect on the results. The estimated baseline component of the unemployment gap is
reduced to 5.5 percentage points and the situation component to 0.57 percentage points.
Nevertheless, the diﬀerence to the baseline estimates is not statistically signiﬁcant. Diﬀer-
entiating between home country groups shows that the unemployment gap varies strongly
over immigrant groups. I ﬁnd the highest baseline component for people from Turkey
with 10.1 percentage points. The estimate for the next following group, people from for-
mer Yugoslavia, is with 5.4 percentage points only about half as large. The estimates
for people from Eastern and Southern European countries are with 4.016 and 3.5 percent-
16Including additional samples from the GSOEP, the estimator for people from Eastern Europe becomes
much larger. This is not surprising as after 1989 many people from Eastern Europe have immigrated to
Germany and fundamentally changed this population group.
10age points still smaller and the estimate for people born elsewhere is even insigniﬁcant.
The estimates for the situation component of the unemployment gap are only signiﬁcant
for people from Turkey and former Yugoslavia; they are 1.08 and and 1.40 percentage
points. Thus, immigrants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia exhibit not only the largest
unemployment compared to natives; they also suﬀer most from deteriorations of the labor-
market situation in Germany. This indicates that integration policy should focus on these
two groups, that are both among the largest.
Analyzing the employment gap instead of the unemployment gap leads to an interest-
ing result. Deﬁning immigrants as foreigners, the estimator for the baseline component
is with 4.6 percentage points noticeably smaller than the estimator for the unemploy-
ment gap with 5.6 percentage points (see table 2). The situation component is with 1.31
percentage almost twice as high. Deﬁning immigrants as foreign born people and dif-
ferentiating between home country groups shows the same picture (see table 3). Thus,
compared to natives, the employment of immigrants obviously reacts more to changes
on the labor market than their unemployment. The fact that immigrants in most cases
have/had17 shorter claims for unemployment insurance may be an explanation for this,
although unemployment is self-assessed. Nevertheless, the extent of the diﬀerence remains
puzzling.
4 Educational degrees and experience
Since the ground-breaking work of Mincer (1974) empirical economists generally use years
of schooling or educational degrees and employment experience to explain the labor mar-
ket success of individuals. In virtually all studies, independent if labor market success
is measured by employment probabilities, wages or something else, statistically and eco-
nomically highly signiﬁcant eﬀects of education and experience are found. Immigrants
and natives in Germany strongly diﬀer with respect to their educational degrees. In 2005
14% of the foreign born people between 25 and 65 had no educational degree, whereas
the overall share was only 4% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007).18 Thus, the diﬀerence
17Before the Hartz IV reforms 2005 unemployment beneﬁt claims strongly depended on the time that
a person has worked in Germany.
18Nevertheless, as shown in Geis et al. (2009), diﬀerentiating between education groups, immigrant
unemployment rates are still considerably higher than native unemployment rates.
11in the education structure between immigrants and natives suggest itself to explain the
unemployment gap.
From a theoretic point of view, the eﬀects of the low education and experience levels
of immigrants on the baseline component of the unemployment gap is obvious. The Ger-
man labor market exhibits frictions that aﬀect primarily low skilled labor; in particular,
the generous social beneﬁts in Germany lead to such frictions. These frictions prevent
wages from declining to the equilibrium level and thus lead to unemployment. By the
same reasoning, an eﬀect of education and experience on the situation component of the
unemployment gap can be explained. A worsening of the labor-market situation is gener-
ally connected with a reduction of productivity. This reduction should lead to declining
wages. However, labor market frictions prevent this, so that unemployment increases.
As the frictions work stronger for low skilled people, their unemployment increases more;
thus, the low education level of immigrants can also explain the situation component of
the unemployment gap.
As to cyclical changes which are the driving force behind changes in the labor-market
situation, there is yet another explanation for the diﬀerent reactions of immigrant and
native unemployment. Besides general human capital, workers also need job / ﬁrm speciﬁc
human capital. Job speciﬁc human capital has, at least partly, to be ﬁnanced by the
employer; hence, hiring a new worker is more costly than retaining an incumbent worker.
If a worker is not needed for a certain time but his job has to be ﬁlled again later on,
depending on the time span, it can pay oﬀ for the employer to hold the worker. The
higher the job speciﬁc human capital of a worker, the more likely he is retained for
a certain time span, for instance during a recession, although he is not needed. High
skilled workers generally need more ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital than low skilled workers,
think for instance of assembly-line workers and developing engineers; thus, they are more
likely retained. Unfortunately, thorough theoretical and empirical research in how far
the eﬀects of business cycles on low and high skilled labor diﬀer does not yet exists.19
Nevertheless, additional estimation results, discussed in Appendix A, show that low skilled
unemployment in Germany indeed reacts more to changes in the labor-market situation
than high skilled unemployment.
To control for education in my estimations, I use the Comparative Analysis of So-
19Hoynes (2009) and Dustmann et al. (2009) indicate that low skilled workers are stronger aﬀected by
business cycles.
12cial Mobility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN) classiﬁcation for educational degrees. The
CASMIN classiﬁcation divides educational degrees into eight20 groups (see Brauns et al.
(2003)). It is similar to the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED),
but considers explicitly vocational degrees. These vocational degrees play an important
role on the German labor market; thus, they should be considered analyzing unemploy-
ment. Employment experience is directly observed in the GSOEP;21 following the liter-
ature I also include its square in the regressions to control for potential non-linearities.
Not only employment experience but also unemployment experience can aﬀect human
capital and labor market success of an individual; motivation often decreases and skills
that have to be trained continuously, as ﬂuency in a foreign language, decline. Analogous
to employment experience, I also add unemployment experience and its square in my
estimations. In addition to education and experience, I also control in all regression for
sex, age and birth cohort (measured by year of birth).
Estimation results including the controls for education, experience and personal char-
acteristics are given in table 4.22 All estimates, including the ones for unemployment
experience, have the expected signs and are highly signiﬁcant (except for one CASMIN
dummy). Deﬁning immigrants as foreigners, the estimator for the baseline component
of the unemployment gap is 1.5 percentage points and the estimator for the situation
component is 0.15 percentage points; both are statistically signiﬁcant. A comparison
with the results without controls shows that educational degrees and experience reduce
the estimate for the baseline component by about 3/4 and the estimate for the situation
component by about 4/5. Deﬁning immigrants as foreign born leads with 1.4 percentage
points to a similar estimator for the baseline component; however, the situation compo-
nent is with 0.8 percentage points considerably smaller and insigniﬁcant. Diﬀerentiating
between home country groups leads to similar ﬁndings, see table 5. Only the baseline
component for people from Turkey and the situation components for people from Turkey
and former Yugoslavia are still signiﬁcant at the 5%-level;23 compared to the regression
without controls the estimated eﬀects all decreased by more than 2/3.
20In the GSOEP and in my estimations level 2c is further divided into vocational and general maturity.
21The GSOEP even distinguishes between experience in full and part time employment. I use the sum
of the two as employment experience.
22The square terms do not appear in the tables, as for them no own marginal eﬀect exists. Their
estimators are highly signiﬁcant.
23At the 10%-level the baseline component for people from Southern Europe is also signiﬁcant.
13Table 4: Education and experience eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0063*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0036***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Foreigner 0.0149*** 0.0146*** 0.0082 0.0127*** 0.0116***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0070) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Foreigner*unempl. 0.0015** 0.0019*** 0.0064*** 0.0014* 0.0012***





Female 0.0061*** 0.0072*** 0.1487*** 0.0056*** 0.0061*** 0.0061***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0057) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Age 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0141*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Birth year -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0024*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Employment -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0192*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011***
experience (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment 0.0171*** 0.0183*** 0.0593*** 0.0170*** 0.0171*** 0.0170***
experience (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
CASMIN 1a 0.0329*** 0.0346*** 0.1352*** 0.0350*** 0.0328*** 0.0317***
(inad. completed) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0154) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0062)
CASMIN 1b 0.0189*** 0.0187*** 0.0739*** 0.0198*** 0.0188*** 0.0189***
(gen. el. school) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0098) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033)
CASMIN 1c 0.0110*** 0.0113*** 0.0527*** 0.0112*** 0.0110*** 0.0114***
(basic voc. qual.) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0081) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
CASMIN 2b 0.0012 0.0037 0.0261** 0.0019 0.0011 0.0010
(inter. gen. qual.) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0119) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
CASMIN 2c-gen. -0.0164*** -0.0171*** 0.0754*** -0.0166*** -0.0164*** -0.0165***
(gen. mat. cert.) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0149) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
CASMIN 2c-voc. -0.0131*** -0.0135*** -0.0659*** -0.0134*** -0-0130*** -0-0131***
(voc. mat. cert.) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0101) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
CASMIN 3a -0.0136*** -0.0154*** -0.1088*** -0.0139*** -0.0135*** -0.0135***
(lower tert. ed.) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0123) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036)
CASMIN 3b -0.0167*** -0.0154*** -0.1282*** -0.0169*** -0.0167*** -0.0167***





R2 0.2388 0.2350 0.2395 0.2384 0.2388 0.2389
Observations 122956 133536 158451 122956 122956 122956
Sample A+B A-D A+B A+B A+B A+B
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for unemployment/employment, in (3) it is non-employment/employment.
The estimation method is pooled Probit and the displayed coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects at the mean. Standard errors
are given in parenthesis; * signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 3%level and *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. The
reference category for the education levels is CASMIN 2a (intermediate vocational qualiﬁcation).
Although foreign educational degrees are oﬃcially equivalent to native degrees, their
contents can strongly diﬀer. Thus, people who have acquired a degree abroad may not be
perfect substitutes for people who have acquired the degree in the immigration country.
This could be one explanation why the unemployment gap is still signiﬁcant. The GSOEP
contains the information if the highest degree has been acquired in Germany or abroad.24
24I use a dummy variable indicating, if a person has acquired her highest educational or her highest
vocational degree or both abroad.
14Table 5: Diﬀerentiation by home country with controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0032*** 0.0031*** 0.0052***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Born in Turkey 0.0251*** 0.0125** 0.0062 0.0068 0.0055 0.0303
(0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0192)
Turkey*unemployment 0.0033** 0.0028** 0.0022* 0.0031** 0.0035** 0.0107**
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0050)
Former Yugoslavia 0.0073 -0.0030 -0.0082* -0.0082 -0.0105** -0.0567***
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0196)
Yugoslavia*unempl. 0.0036** 0.0021 0.0018 0.0013 0.0015 0.0096*
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0056)
Southern Europe 0.0069* 0.0006 -0.0052 -0.0070 -0.0095** -0.0610***
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0180)
S. Europe*unempl. -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0022* -0.0017 -0.0016 0.0004
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0050)
Eastern Europe 0.0081 0.0076 0.0069 0.0093 0.0197*** 0.0338
(0.0082 (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0108) (0.0058) (0.0268)
E. Europe*unempl. 0.0008 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0005 0.0025
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0076)
Born elsewhere 0.0102 0.0085 0.0045 -0.0039 0.0047 0.0095
(0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0299)
Elsewere*unempl. -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0019*
(0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0103)
Mostly foreign 0.0087*** 0.0075*** 0.0069*** 0.0082*** 0.0687***
language at home (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0144)
Partly foreign 0.0046*** 0.0032** 0.0036** 0.0038** 0.0237**
language at home (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0107)
Foreigner 0.0091** 0.0055 0.0071 -0.0076
(0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.00141)
No contact 0.0173** 0.0188*** 0.0519***
to Germans (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0187)
Number of friends -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0013**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006)
R2 0.2395 0.2489 0.2489 0.2579 0.2541 0.3124
Observations 122956 104165 104165 82093 90637 105238
Sample A+B A+B A+B A+B A-D A+B
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for unemployment/employment, in (6) it is non-employment/employment.
The estimation method is pooled Probit and the displayed coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects at the mean. Standard errors
are given in parenthesis; * signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 3%level and *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. Not
shown in the table in all regression CASMIN-Dummies, (squared) employment and unemployment experience, age birth
year and sex were used as additional explaining variables.
Including an indicator for the place of the highest degree in my regression, I ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant eﬀect. Besides degrees, working experience may also be imperfectly comparable
over countries. Therefore, I also use the years a person has lived aborad as additional
control; the estimated eﬀect is also insigniﬁcant. In both cases, the estimators for the
situation component of the unemployment gap virtually did not change; the changes in
the estimators for the baseline component are not signiﬁcant. Thus, the place where
educational degrees and employment experience are acquired does obviously not play an
important role for the success of immigrants on the German labor market.
155 Assimilation and language usage
Beginning with Chiswick (1978), numerous economic papers deal with the eﬀects of as-
similation on the labor market success of immigrants. The large part of these papers
measures labor market success by income; nevertheless, some papers as Clark and Lind-
ley (2009) and Venturini and Villosio (2008) also consider the employment probability as
an additional indicator.25 Empirical analyses have shown that (directly) after arriving in
the immigration country immigrants earn much lower wages and have a lower probability
to be employed than comparable natives. With the time an immigrant has spent in the
immigration country, his wage converges in most cases to the level of comparable natives.26
With respect to employment, such an assimilation process is less obvious (see Clark and
Lindley, 2009; Venturini and Villosio, 2008). The need for immigrant assimilation can be
explained by lacking immigration country speciﬁc skills, especially language ﬂuency, at
the time of arrival.27
The years that an immigrant has lived in the immigration country are an obvious
and often used measure for assimilation. As long as only immigrants are considered, the
usage of years since migration as an explaining variable in a regression analysis does not
pose a problem. However, as the aim of my estimations is to explain diﬀerences in the
unemployment rates between natives and foreigners, I necessarily also have to consider
observations for natives; years since migration cannot even be set missing for them. What
is now the “right” value for the years since migration of natives? At ﬁrst sight, one could
think of setting years since migration to zero for natives; however, this is nonsense, as
it would mean that natives have the same degree of assimilation as foreigners who have
just arrived. Another possibility would be to set years since migration equal to some
large value (e.g. 100 or the life expectancy); nevertheless, the (exact) value for years of
migration would neither be justiﬁed.
There is a possibility to control for years since migration in the regressions in spite of
25Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2007) analyze occupational assimilation instead of income assimi-
lation.
26See Borjas (1994) and Borjas (1999)
27Immigrant assimilation can also be explained independent of an increase in human capital. Assume
that there is on the job search of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998)-type. Immigrants have to anew start
their career path when they enter the immigration country (searching a ﬁrst job, improving their wages
by job changes and wage bargaining etc.). Thus their wages successively assimilate to the native wage
level.
16Table 6: Assimilation and language ﬂuency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0064***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0011)
Foreigner 0.0106*** 0.0128*** 0.0074** 0.0062*** -0.0294***
(0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0093)
Foreigner*unempl. 0.0012 0.0014* 0.0008 0.0007 0.0070***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0025)




Years in Germany -0.0002
(0.0002)
Years since migration 0.0003
(0.0002)
Years in Germany/age -0.0052
(0.0059)
Mostly foreign 0.0088*** 0.0096*** 0.0862***
language at home (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0116)
Partly foreign 0.0035** 0.0045*** 0.0253***
language at home (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0089)
Language of -0.0020***
newspaper reading (0.0005)
R2 0.2391 0.2388 0.2481 0.2448 0.2480 0.3026
Observations 122956 122956 104165 108082 104165 133846
Sample A+B A+B A+B A+B A+B A+B
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for unemployment/employment, in (6) it is non-employment/employment.
The estimation method is pooled Probit and the displayed coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects at the mean. Standard errors
are given in parenthesis; * signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 3%level and *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. Not
shown in the table in all regression CASMIN-Dummies, (squared) employment and unemployment experience, age birth
year and sex were used as additional explaining variables. The reference category for (4) is only German spoken at home.
Missing values are imputed by person using the next following (next preceding) year for which an observation exists; persons
without any observation are not considered.
this problem. If the number of years that an individual has lived in Germany is used as
an additional control variable, years since migration can be interpreted as an interaction
between years in Germany and being foreign born.28 Including the two variables in my
baseline estimation, the estimator for years since migration is statistically insigniﬁcant and
positive, see table 6. 29 Assimilation would imply a negative eﬀect. As being foreigner is
the deﬁnition of immigrants in the baseline and years since migration is an interaction of
being foreign born, I control for both in the estimation. Only being foreigner is signiﬁcant,
indicating that nationality is more important for the unemployment gap than country of
birth; not shown in the paper, this ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by further robustness checks. One
could argue that the ability of an immigrant to assimilate depends on the age at which she
has immigrated. Then, an obvious measure for assimilation would be years in Germany
28This means that natives get a value of zero. However in the calculation of the marginal eﬀects, it is
considered that years since migration only have explaining power for foreigners.
29Summing up the estimators for years since migration and years in Germany also leads to a positive
value.
17relative to age. Compared to years since migration, this measure has the additional
advantage that no control for years in Germany is needed, which can be problematic
in combination with age. The estimated eﬀect for this relative assimilation measure is
negative, as expected (see table 6); however, it is insigniﬁcant. Thus, my estimation
results indicate that the time immigrants have spent in Germany does not explain their
employment situation; it is neither an (important) determinant of the native-immigrant
unemployment gap.
Language skills are generally the most important part of country speciﬁc human cap-
ital. Thus, they are probably the better measure for the labor-market relevant aspects of
immigrant assimilation than years since migration. The GSOEP does not directly mea-
sure the language ﬂuency of immigrants; however, it contains a question on the language
spoken at home. Three response options are given: mostly German, mostly my native
language and both. Using this information, I built dummy variables for speaking mostly
a foreign language at home and speaking partly a foreign language at home (the answer
both).30 Including these two dummies in my baseline speciﬁcation, I get highly signiﬁ-
cant and positive estimators for them. In addition, as expected, the estimate for mostly
speaking a foreign language at home is larger than the estimate for partly speaking a
foreign language. The inclusion of language skills into my estimation has also a strong
eﬀect on the estimators for both components of native-immigrant unemployment gap.
The baseline component is with 0.74 percentage points only about half as large as in the
case without this controls (1.49 percentage points); nevertheless, it is still signiﬁcant at
the 5%-level. The estimate for the situation component is statistically insigniﬁcant and
with 0.08 percentage points negligibly small.31
Robustness checks conﬁrm these results. Deﬁning immigrants as foreign born people
leads to a similar picture, although the estimator for the baseline component is with 0.53
percentage points smaller and only signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, see table 6. Diﬀerentiating
between home country groups, only baseline and situation component for people from
Turkey remain signiﬁcant, see table 5. Considering countries of birth, naturalization and
30This information is not available for all years. For immigrants, for whom at least one observation
exists, missing years have been imputed. In a loop, missing values have in a ﬁrst step been replace by
the value for the following year and in a second step by the value of the preceding year.
31The estimate indicates that an increase in overall unemployment by 10 percentage points leads only
to a 0.8 percentage points higher increase in the unemployment rate of immigrants compared to the
increase in the unemployment rate of natives with the same human capital endowment; an eﬀect that is
obviously economically insigniﬁcant.
18thus nationality can also be a measure of assimilation. Including a foreigner dummy, the
baseline eﬀect for people from Turkey becomes also insigniﬁcant. Analyzing the native-
immigrant employment gap instead of the unemployment gap leads to weird results: The
estimator for the baseline component is highly signiﬁcant and negative; the estimator
for the situation component is highly signiﬁcant and positive. This would indicate that
foreigners are less likely to be non-working than comparable natives in good economic
situations but react more to economic changes by leaving the labor market. As a further
robustness check, I use a diﬀerent measure of language skills. The GSOEP contains also
the following question: What nationality newspaper do you read? with response options
ranging from 1 Only newspaper of my home country to 5 only German newspapers.32 Using
this variable instead of the language spoken at home leads to similar estimates for the two
components of the unemployment gap, see table 6.33 Nevertheless, as many people do not
read newspapers regularly, this measure may be doubtful. Therefore, language spoken at
home is used as control for language skills in the following.
Altogether, my estimations show that the language skills of immigrants, or more
broadly their country speciﬁc human capital, are an important explanation for the native-
immigrant unemployment gap. Controlling for language skills, the situation component
of the gap becomes insigniﬁcant. Thus, the stronger reaction of immigrant unemployment
to labor market changes can potentially be fully explained by their lower human capital
endowment. Lacking language skills are also an explanation for the baseline component
of the gap; nevertheless, the baseline component is not fully explained by diﬀerences in
human capital endowment. In addition, the results in this section indicate that years
since migration are not closely related to language skills and cannot explain immigrant
unemployment. This is in line with Schmidt (1997), who shows that earnings of immi-
grants in Germany neither strictly increase with years since migration. The labor market
situation of immigrants does obviously not automatically improve with the time spent in
Germany.
32Natives are assumed to read only German newspapers. For immigrants who state to read no news-
paper at all, the variable is set to missing. Missing years are imputed as described above.
33Not shown in the paper including both measures in the same regression leads to weird results.
196 Discrimination and social networks
In the preceding chapters, I have analyzed the impact of diﬀerences in the human capital
endowment on the native-immigrant unemployment gap and found that these diﬀerences
cannot full explain the gap. Although human capital is surely the most important deter-
minant of the labor market success of an individual, it is not the only one. Her social
position also aﬀect her labor-market situation. Various factors determine the social po-
sition of an individual; such factors are the inﬂuence that she has on others, the extent
to which others owe her favors and the number and social positions of other individuals
with whom she is acquainted. Human capital is certainly an important determinant of
the social position of an individual; however, it cannot fully explain it.34 Other factors,
like the possession of an individual and the social position of her parents, also play an
important role.
There are various modes of action how the position in the society of an individual,
or more concretely her social network, aﬀects her labor market success. First, the social
contacts of an individual determine which information she has about the labor market.35
This information is particularly important for job search. If an individual does not know
that there is a job oﬀer or that she is potentially suited for it, she will not apply. Even
if a job oﬀer is publicized, social contacts can help individuals to ﬁnd out about it, as
collecting information on job oﬀers is not costless. The second mode of action is also
related to the information ﬂow. Potential employers have more information about people
with whom they have direct or indirect social contacts. Everything else equal, a risk
averse employer will prefer a candidate about whom he has more information.
A further argument why employers should prefer applicants with a high social position
is gift exchange. Potential employers may already owe the candidate or some of his
relatives a favor or they want the candidate or his relatives to owe them a favor. In
Germany, gift exchange is not important for regular jobs; however, for internships and
the like it sometimes plays a role. In addition, the position in the society determines the
picture that an individual has of herself. A strong position generally leads to a better
and more precise picture. This in turn helps the individual to sell herself in interviews
34In how far the position is explained by human capital depends in how far soft skills, as capacity for
teamwork, are regarded as human capital.
35It can also aﬀect the time, when she has the information; having earlier the information of a job oﬀer,
an individual can for instance better prepare application documents.
20and the like. Many more channels through which the position of an individual in the
society aﬀect her labor-market success are imaginable. Unfortunately, up to now, there
is not much research on the eﬀects of the social position on the labor market success of
individuals (see Granovetter, 2005; Montgomery, 1991, for theoretic approaches).
The most obvious argument why the position of immigrants in the society should on
average be lower than the position of natives is discrimination. Other members of the
society may simply not be willing to have social contacts to them because they are im-
migrants or because of their ethnicity (discrimination in the sense of Becker, 1971); thus,
employers may not be willing to hire immigrants. Beckerian discrimination is not the only
potential explanation for disadvantages of immigrants in recruitment processes; informa-
tion asymmetries and statistical discrimination may also play a role. In particular with
respect to application documents, there can be very pronounce information asymmetries.
A potential employer can often quite exactly assess the content of native degrees and the
quality of native educational institutions, whereas she has hardly an idea of foreign degrees
and institutions. If such an employer is risk averse, she always prefers a native worker
to a comparable immigrant worker. Similarly, immigrants, or a certain group of them,
may on average have worse labor market relevant characteristics compared to natives, for
instance worse language skills. In this case, an employer who cannot completely observe
these characteristics of an applicant will also prefer natives (statistical discrimination).36
The eﬀect of discrimination on the labor market success of immigrants is often mea-
sured by the following approach. In an estimation controls for all observed labor mar-
ket relevant characteristics are used. The remaining diﬀerence between immigrants and
natives is then ascribed to discrimination, see for instance Nielsen et al. (2004). This
approach is not convincing as it requires that all labor market relevant characteristics are
observed;37 otherwise the estimated discrimination eﬀect is biased and no statement on
discrimination can be made. In general, there is hardly an alternative to this approach,
as an objective measure for discrimination does not exists. The GSOEP oﬀers a question
on experienced discrimination. Of course, self-assessed discrimination is no clean measure
for real discrimination; immigrants will often not be aware that they have worse labor
market relevant characteristics than natives and ascribe disadvantages to discrimination.
Nevertheless, estimation results should give us at least an idea about the eﬀects of discrim-
36See e.g. Altonji and Pierret (2001), Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008).
37Moreover, it has to be controlled for all non-linearities in the eﬀects of these characteristics.
21Table 7: Discrimination and social networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.0036*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 0.0057***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Foreigner 0.0051 0.0027 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0303***
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0112)
Foreigner*unempl. 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0013* 0.0067**





Mostly foreign 0.0076*** 0.0083*** 0.0075*** 0.0104*** 0.0085*** 0.0811***
language at home (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0141)
Partly foreign 0.0028* 0.0041* 0.0036** 0.0055*** 0.0043*** 0.0269**





No contact 0.0190*** 0.0181*** 0.0204*** 0.0189*** 0.0550***
to Germans (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0190)
Number of friends -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0011*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006)
R2 0.2486 0.2565 0.2569 0.2519 0.2565 0.3109
Observations 104165 82093 82093 90637 82093 105238
Sample A+B A+B A+B A-D A+B A+B
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for unemployment/employment, in (6) it is non-employment/employment.
The estimation method is pooled Probit and the displayed coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects at the mean. Standard errors
are given in parenthesis; * signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 3%level and *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. Not
shown in the table in all regression CASMIN-Dummies, (squared) employment and unemployment experience, age birth
year and sex were used as additional explaining variables. Missing values are imputed by person using the next following
(next preceding) year for which an observation exists; persons without any observation are not considered .
ination; they should more or less be an upper bound. The exact wording of the question
on discrimination is: Over the last two years how often were you discriminated against
in Germany based on your origin. with response options never, seldom and often.38 In-
cluding dummies for being often and seldom discriminated against aﬀects the estimates
for the unemployment gap. Not only the estimate for the situation component, that has
already been insigniﬁcant before, but also the estimate for the baseline component is now
insigniﬁcant and small, see table 7; the estimators for discrimination are positive and
highly signiﬁcant.
Discrimination is not the only potential reason for a lower position of immigrants in
the society compared to natives. Diﬀerences in social networks can also play a role. The
migration literature has shown that, in most cases, people migrate in the context migrant
networks (see Munshi, 2003); thus, they have a social network in the immigration country
immediately after their arrival. Nevertheless, compared to the networks of natives the
38Missing values are imputed as for language spoken at home.
22networks of immigrants may on average still be small disconnected to the networks of
natives who are inﬂuential on the labor market. A rough measure for the size of the
social network of an individual is the number of her (good) friends; the GSOEP contains
a question on this. A rough measure for the connection of immigrant and native networks
are private contacts between immigrants and natives. Based on questions on visits from
and with Germans, I built a dummy variable indicating if an immigrant has private
contacts to Germans or not. Including these two variables in my estimations has the
same eﬀect as including discrimination. Both, the estimator for the situation component
and the estimator for the baseline component, are insigniﬁcant and small, see table 7.
Having no contacts to Germans is highly signiﬁcant and has the expected positive sign,
the number of friends is highly signiﬁcant and has the expected negative sign. Various
robustness checks lead to the same results, see tables 5 and 7.
including both number of friend and no contact to Germans as well as self-assessed
discrimination in a regression, both have signiﬁcant eﬀects (see table 7). Thus, the eﬀect
of discrimination on employment is not explained by my measures for diﬀerences in social
networks. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that discrimination plays an im-
portant role on the German labor market. On the one hand, self-assessed discrimination
is at least to a certain degree endogenous, so that its estimate is upward biased. On the
other hand, my measures for social networks are very rough. Thus, their estimates show
that social networks have an eﬀect on the individual employment probability. However,
they probably do not capture the complete eﬀect of social networks on un-/employment.
Therefore, one should also be cautious interpreting their estimates quantitatively.
7 Conclusions
The unemployment rate of immigrants in Germany is not only higher than the rate of
natives but also reacts more to changes in the labor-market situation. Decomposing
the native-immigrant unemployment gap into a baseline and a situation component, I
ﬁnd a baseline component of 5.6 percentage points and a situation component of 0.7
percentage points. The large part of the diﬀerence, about 3/4 of the baseline and 4/5 of
the situation component, can be explained by diﬀerences in the endowment with classical
human capital (educational degrees and experience). Also controlling for language skills,
the situation component becomes insigniﬁcant and the baseline component again decreases
by 1/2. Adding (self-assessed) discrimination and/or controls for social networks the
23baseline component also becomes insigniﬁcant.
What do these results imply for immigration and integration policy? If Germany wants
to decrease its immigrant unemployment, it has to improve the education of immigrants.
In the long run, a higher education level will quite likely also improve the position of
immigrants in the German society. Improving language ﬂuency is probably easier for an
immigrant than reaching a higher educational degree; good language skills are actually
a precondition to acquire an additional degree in Germany. Thus, the starting point
for immigration policy are (better) language classes for immigrants; possibly, immigrants
have to be obligated to join this programs. The native-immigrant unemployment gap
in Germany is immense and the costs of unemployment for the German state are large
due to the generous welfare state. Thus, if a measure to improve the human capital of
immigrants is eﬀective, even rather high investments in it will pay oﬀ. Hence, research
and political eﬀort should be put in the search of eﬀective measures.
My results have also some implication for further research on integration of immi-
grants. First, besides human capital, social networks and the like are also an explanation
for diﬀerences in the labor-market success between immigrants and natives. To fully
understand how social networks aﬀect the labor market success of immigrants, more the-
oretic and empiric research necessary. Disentangling the eﬀects of discrimination and
social networks would not only be an enrichment for the (economic) research on inte-
gration and minorities; social networks cannot also be a starting point for integration
policy. Second, immigrant employment in Germany reacts much stronger to changes on
the labor market, especially business cycles, than native unemployment. Thus, analyz-
ing diﬀerences between immigrant and native un-/employment the labor-market situation
has to be considered. This is especially important for evaluations of immigration policy
measures under changing labor market situations.
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8 Appendix: Cyclicality of skill-speciﬁc unemployment
As discussed in section 3, up to now there is not much evidence on the connection between
skill level and cyclicality of unemployment. Using the data from the GSOEP, I test
if low skilled unemployment reacts more to changes of the labor-market situation than
high skilled unemployment. Analogous to the analysis of the situation component of the
native-immigrant unemployment gap, I regress individual un-/employment on the overall
unemployment rate, the individual education level and an interaction between the two.
The results are given in table A1 and clearly show that low skilled unemployment reacts
more to changes on the labor market than high skilled unemployment. As I do not want to
control for some sort of selection here, the regressions are weighted by standard population
weights.
27Table 8: Skill-speciﬁc unemployment and labor-market changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unempl. rate 0.0102*** 0.0074*** 0.0069*** 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 0.0036***
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
CASMIN -0.0172*** -0.0139*** -0.0070*** -0.0057***
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0004)
CASMIN*unempl. -0.0023*** -0.0017*** -0.0009*** -0.0009***


































(higher tert. ed.) (0.0034)
CASMIN3a*un. -0.0035***
(0.0010)
R2 0.0650 0.0414 0.0316 0.2498 0.2387 0.2512
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Sample Overall West West West A+B West
The estimation method is pooled Probit and the displayed coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects at the mean; the dependent
variable is individual unemployment. Except for (5), which is unweighed, all estimations are weighted by population
weights. Standard errors are given in parenthesis;* signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 3%level and ***
signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. Controls include (squared) employment and unemployment experience, age birth year sex
and an foreigner/native. The reference category for the education levels in (6) is CASMIN 2a (intermediate vocational
qualiﬁcation).
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